ALGORITHMICALLY EFFECTIVE DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE SYNTHETIC DATA

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Abstract

We present a highly effective algorithmic approach for generating ε -differentially private synthetic data in a bounded metric space with near-optimal utility guarantees under the 1-Wasserstein distance. In particular, for a dataset \mathcal{X} in the hypercube $[0, 1]^d$, our algorithm generates synthetic dataset \mathcal{Y} such that the expected 1-Wasserstein distance between the empirical measure of \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} is $O((\varepsilon n)^{-1/d})$ for $d \ge 2$, and is $O(\log^2(\varepsilon n)(\varepsilon n)^{-1})$ for d = 1. The accuracy guarantee is optimal up to a constant factor for $d \ge 2$, and up to a logarithmic factor for d = 1. Our algorithm has a fast running time of $O(\varepsilon dn)$ for all $d \ge 1$ and demonstrates improved accuracy compared to the method in [12] for $d \ge 2$.

1. INTRODUCTION

Differential privacy has become the benchmark for privacy protection in scenarios where vast amounts of data need to be analyzed. The aim of differential privacy is to prevent the disclosure of information about individual participants in the dataset. In simple terms, an algorithm that has a randomized output and produces similar results when given two adjacent datasets is considered to be differentially private. This method of privacy protection is increasingly being adopted and implemented in various fields, including the 2020 US Census [2, 29, 28] and numerous machine learning tasks [24].

A wide range of data computations can be performed in a differentially private manner, including regression [17], clustering [37], parameter estimation [21], stochastic gradient descent [36], and deep learning [1]. However, many existing works on differential privacy focus on designing algorithms for specific tasks and are restricted to queries that are predefined before use. This requires expert knowledge and often involves modifying existing algorithms.

One promising solution to this challenge is to generate a synthetic dataset similar to the original dataset with guaranteed differential privacy [27, 8, 31, 7, 10, 11, 12]. As any downstream tasks are based on the synthetic dataset, they can be performed without incurring additional privacy costs.

1.1. **Private synthetic data.** Mathematically, the problem of generating private synthetic data can be defined as follows. Let (Ω, ρ) be a metric space. Consider a dataset $\mathcal{X} = (X_1, \ldots, X_n) \in \Omega^n$. Our goal is to construct an efficient randomized algorithm that outputs differentially private synthetic data $\mathcal{Y} = (Y_1, \ldots, Y_m) \in \Omega^m$ such that the two empirical measures

$$\mu_{\mathcal{X}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \delta_{X_i}$$
 and $\mu_{\mathcal{Y}} = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \delta_{Y_i}$

are close to each other. We measure the utility of the output by $\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}})$, where $W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}})$ is the 1-Wasserstein distance, and the expectation is taken over the randomness of the algorithm. The Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality (see, e.g., [47]) gives an equivalent representation of the 1-Wasserstein distance between two measures $\nu_{\mathcal{X}}$ and $\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}$:

$$W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) = \sup_{\text{Lip}(f) \le 1} \left(\int f d\mu_{\mathcal{X}} - \int f d\mu_{\mathcal{Y}} \right), \tag{1.1}$$

where the supremum is taken over the set of all 1-Lipschitz functions on Ω . Since many machine learning algorithms are Lipschitz [48, 32, 15, 35], Equation (1.1) provides a uniform accuracy guarantee for a wide range of machine learning tasks performed on synthetic datasets whose empirical measure is close to μ_{χ} in the 1-Wasserstein distance.

1.2. **Main results.** The most straightforward way to construct differentially private synthetic data is to add independent noise to the location of each data point. However, this method can result in a significant loss of data utility as the amount of noise needed for privacy protection may be too large [20]. Another direct approach could be to add noise to the density function of the empirical measure of \mathcal{X} , by dividing Ω into small subregions and perturbing the true counts in each subregion. However, Laplacian noise may perturb the count in a certain subregion to negative, causing the output to become a signed measure. To address this issue, we introduce an algorithmically effective method called the *Private Measure Mechanism*.

Private Measure Mechanism (PMM). PMM makes the count zero if the noisy count in a subregion is negative. Instead of a single partition of Ω , we consider a collection of binary hierarchical partitions on Ω and add inhomogeneous noise to each level of the partition. However, the counts of two subregions do not always add up to the count of the region at a higher level. We develop an algorithm that enforces the consistency of counts in regions at different levels. PMM has $O(\varepsilon dn)$ running time while the running time of the approach in [12] is polynomial in n.

The accuracy analysis of PMM uses the hierarchical partitions to estimate the 1-Wasserstein distance in terms of the multi-scale geometry of Ω and the noise magnitude in each level of the partition. In particular, when $\Omega = [0,1]^d$, by optimizing the choice of the hierarchical partitions and noise magnitude, PMM achieves better accuracy compared to [12] for $d \ge 2$. The accuracy is optimal rate up to a constant factor for $d \ge 2$, and up to a logarithmic factor for d = 1. We state it in the next theorem.

The hierarchical partitions appeared in many previous works on the approximation of distributions under Wasserstein distances in a non-private setting, including [4, 18, 50]. In the differential privacy literature, the hierarchical partitions are also closely related to the binary tree mechanism [22, 16] for differential privacy under continual observation. However, the accuracy analysis of the two mechanisms is significantly different. In addition, the TopDown algorithm in the 2020 census [3] also has a similar hierarchical structure and enforces consistency, but the accuracy analysis of the algorithm is not provided in [3].

Theorem 1.1 (PMM for data in a hypercube). Let $\Omega = [0, 1]^d$ equipped with the ℓ^{∞} metric. PMM outputs an ε -differentially private synthetic dataset \mathcal{Y} in time $O(\varepsilon dn)$ such that

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \le \begin{cases} C \log^2(\varepsilon n)(\varepsilon n)^{-1} & \text{if } d = 1\\ C(\varepsilon n)^{-\frac{1}{d}} & \text{if } d \ge 2 \end{cases}$$

Private Signed Measure Mechanism (PSMM). In addition to PMM, we introduce an alternative method, the *Private Signed Measure Mechanism*, that achieves optimal accuracy rate on $[0, 1]^d$ when $d \ge 3$ in poly(n) time. The analysis of PSMM is not restricted to 1-Wasserstein distance, and it can be generalized to provide a uniform utility guarantee of other function classes.

We first partition the domain Ω into m subregions $\Omega_1, \ldots, \Omega_m$. Perturbing the counts in each subregion with i.i.d. integer Laplacian noise gives an unbiased approximation of $\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}$ with a signed measure ν . Then we find the closest probability measure $\hat{\nu}$ under the bounded Lipschitz distance by solving a linear programming problem.

In the proof of accuracy for PSMM, one ingredient is to estimate the Laplacian complexity of the Lipschitz function class on Ω and connect it to the 1-Wasserstein distance. This type of argument

is similar in spirit to the optimal matching problem for two sets of random points in a metric space [38, 39, 9]. When $\Omega = [0, 1]^d$, PSMM achieves the optimal accuracy rate $O((\varepsilon n)^{-1/d})$ for $d \ge 3$. For d = 2, PSMM achieves a near-optimal accuracy $O(\log(\varepsilon n)(\varepsilon n)^{-1/2})$. For d = 1, the accuracy becomes $O((\varepsilon n)^{-1/2})$.

For the case when d = 2, we believe that the bound in Corollary 3.7 could be improved to $C\sqrt{\log(\varepsilon n)}/\sqrt{\varepsilon n}$ by replacing Dudley's chaining bound in Proposition 3.2 with the generic chaining bound in [39, 19] involving the γ_1 and γ_2 functionals on Ω . We will not pursue this direction in this paper.

Comparison to previous results. [42] proved that it is NP-hard to generate private synthetic data on the Boolean cube which approximately preserves all two-dimensional marginals, assuming the existence of one-way functions. There exists a substantial body of work for differentially private synthetic data with guarantees limited to accuracy bounds for a finite set of specified queries [5, 40, 23, 43, 33, 46, 12, 13, 14].

[49] considered differentially private synthetic data in $[0,1]^d$ with guarantees for any smooth queries with bounded partial derivatives of order K, and achieved an accuracy of $O(\varepsilon^{-1}n^{-\frac{K}{2d+K}})$. Recently, [12] introduced a method based on superregular random walks to generate differentially private synthetic data with near-optimal guarantees in general compact metric spaces. In particular, when the dataset is in $[0,1]^d$, they obtain $\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}},\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \leq C \log^{\frac{3}{2d}}(\varepsilon n)(\varepsilon n)^{-\frac{1}{d}}$. A corresponding lower bound of order $n^{-1/d}$ was also proved in [12, Corollary 9.3]. PMM matches the lower bound up to a constant factor for $d \geq 2$, and up to a logarithmic factor for d = 1.

In terms of computational efficiency, PMM runs in time $O(\varepsilon dn)$. This is more efficient compared to the algorithm in [12].

Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some background on differential privacy and distances between measures. We will first introduce and analyze the easier and more direct method PSMM before our main result. In Section 3, we describe PSMM in detail and prove its privacy and accuracy for data in a bounded metric space, and detailed results are provided for the case for the hypercube. In Section 4, we introduce PMM and analyze its privacy and accuracy. Optimizing the choices of noise parameters, we obtain the optimal accuracy on the hypercube with $O(\varepsilon dn)$ running time, which proves Theorem 1.1.

Additional proofs are included in Appendix A. We use a variant of Laplacian distribution, called *discrete Laplacian distribution*, in PMM and PSMM. The definition and properties of discrete Laplacian distribution are included in Appendix B.

2. PRELIMINARIES

Differential Privacy. We use the following definition from [24]. A randomized algorithm \mathcal{M} provides ε -differential privacy if for any input data D, D' that differs on only one element (or D and D' are adjacent data sets) and for any measurable set $S \subseteq \operatorname{range}(\mathcal{M})$, there is

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}\left\{\mathcal{M}(D)\in S\right\}}{\mathbb{P}\left\{\mathcal{M}(D')\in S\right\}} \le e^{\varepsilon}$$

Here the probability is taken from the probability space of the randomness of \mathcal{M} .

Wasserstein distance. Consider a metric space (Ω, ρ) with two probability measures μ, ν . Then the 1-Wasserstein distance (see e.g., [47] for more details) between them is defined as

$$W_1(\mu,\nu) := \inf_{\gamma \in \Gamma(\mu,\nu)} \int_{\Omega \times \Omega} \rho(x,y) \mathrm{d}\gamma(x,y),$$

where $\gamma(\mu, \nu)$ is the set of all couplings of μ and ν .

Bounded Lipschitz distance. Let (Ω, ρ) be a bounded metric space. The *Lipschitz norm* of a function f is defined as

$$\|f\|_{\operatorname{Lip}} := \max\left\{\operatorname{Lip}(f), \ \frac{\|f\|_{\infty}}{\operatorname{diam}(\Omega)}\right\},\$$

where $\operatorname{Lip}(f)$ is the Lipschitz constant of f. Let \mathcal{F} be the set of all Lipschitz functions f on Ω with $||f||_{\operatorname{Lip}} \leq 1$. For signed measures μ, ν , we define the *bounded Lipschitz distance*:

$$d_{\mathrm{BL}}(\mu,\nu) := \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \left(\int f \mathrm{d}\mu - \int f \mathrm{d}\nu \right).$$

One can easily check that this is a metric. Moreover, in the special case where μ and ν are both probability measures, moving f by a constant does not change the result of $\int f d\mu - \int f d\nu$. Therefore, for a bounded domain Ω , we can always assume $f(x_0) = 0$ for a fixed $x_0 \in \Omega$, then $||f||_{\infty} \leq \text{diam}(\Omega)$ when computing the supremum in (1.1). This implies d_{BL} -metric is equivalent to the classical W_1 -metric when μ, ν are both probability measures on a bounded domain Ω :

$$W_1(\mu,\nu) = \sup_{\operatorname{Lip}(f) \le 1} \left(\int f d\mu - \int f d\nu \right) = \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \left(\int f d\mu - \int f d\nu \right) = d_{\operatorname{BL}}(\mu,\nu).$$
(2.1)

3. PRIVATE SIGNED MEASURE MECHANISM (PSMM)

We will first introduce PSMM, which is an easier and more intuitive approach. The procedure of PSMM is formally described in Algorithm 1. Note that in the *output* step of Algorithm 1, the size of the synthetic data m' depends on the rational approximation of the density function of $\hat{\nu}$, and we discuss the details here. Let $\hat{v}_1, \ldots, \hat{v}_m$ be the weight of the probability measure $\hat{\nu}$ on y_1, \ldots, y_m , respectively. We can choose rational numbers r_1, \ldots, r_m such that $\max_{i \in [m]} |r_i - \hat{v}_i|$ is arbitrarily small. Let m' be the least common multiple of the denominators of r_1, \ldots, r_m , then we output the synthetic dataset $\hat{\mathcal{Y}}$ containing $m'r_i$ copies of y_i for $i = 1, \ldots, m$.

Before analyzing the privacy and accuracy of PSMM, we introduce a useful complexity measure of a given function class, which quantifies the influence of the Laplacian noise on the function class.

Algorithm 1 Private Signed Measure Mechanism

Input: true data $\mathcal{X} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \Omega^n$, partition $(\Omega_1, \ldots, \Omega_m)$ of Ω , privacy parameter $\varepsilon > 0$. **Compute the true counts:** Compute the true count in each regime $n_i = \#\{x_j \in \Omega_i : j \in [n]\}$. **Create a new dataset:** Choose any element $y_i \in \Omega_i$ independently of \mathcal{X} , and let \mathcal{Y} be the collection of n_i copies of y_i for each $i \in [n]$.

Add noise: Perturb the empirical measure $\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}$ of \mathcal{Y} and obtain a signed measure ν such that

$$\nu(\{y_i\}) := (n_i + \lambda_i)/n,$$

where $\lambda_i \sim \text{Lap}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1/\varepsilon)$ are i.i.d. discrete Laplacian random variables.

Linear programming: Find the closest probability measure $\hat{\nu}$ of ν in $d_{\rm BL}$ -metric using Algorithm 2, and generate synthetic data $\hat{\mathcal{Y}}$ from $\hat{\nu}$.

Output: synthetic data $\widehat{\mathcal{Y}} = (y_1, \dots, y_{m'}) \in \Omega^{m'}$ for some integer m'.

Algorithm 2 Linear Programming

m

Input: A discrete signed measure ν supported on $\mathcal{Y} = \{y_1, \ldots, y_m\}$. **Compute the distances:** Compute the pairwise distances $\{||y_i - y_j||_{\infty}, i > j\}$.

Solve the linear programming: Solve the linear programming problem with $2m^2$ variables and m+1 constraints:

$$\begin{split} \min & & \sum_{i,j=1} \|y_i - y_j\|_{\infty} (u_{ij} + u'_{ij}) + 2 \, v_i \\ \text{s.t.} & & \sum_{j=1}^m (u_{ij} - u'_{ij}) + v_i + \tau_i \geq \nu(\{y_i\}), \\ & & & \sum_{i=1}^m \tau_i = 1, \\ & & & u_{ij}, u'_{ij}, v_i, \tau_i \geq 0, \end{split} \quad \forall i, j \leq m, i \neq j. \end{split}$$

Output: a probability measure $\hat{\nu}$ with $\hat{\nu}(\{y_i\}) = \tau_i$.

3.1. Laplacian complexity. Given the Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality (1.1), to control the W_1 distance between the original measure and the private measure, we need to describe how Lipschitz functions behave under Laplacian noise. As an analog of the worst-case Rademacher complexity [6, 25], we consider the worst-case Laplacian complexity. Such a worst-case complexity measure appears since the original dataset is deterministic without any distribution assumption.

Definition 3.1 (Worst-case Laplacian complexity). Let \mathcal{F} be a function class on a metric space Ω . *The worst-case Laplacian complexity of* \mathcal{F} *is defined by*

$$L_n(\mathcal{F}) := \sup_{X_1, \dots, X_n \in \Omega} \mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i f(X_i) \right| \right],$$
(3.1)

where $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_n \sim \text{Lap}(1)$ are *i.i.d.* random variables.

Since Laplacian random variables are sub-exponential but not sub-gaussian, its complexity measure is not equivalent to the Gaussian or Rademacher complexity, but it is related to the suprema of the mixed tail process [19] and the quadratic empirical process [34]. Our next proposition bounds $L_n(\mathcal{F})$ in terms of the covering numbers of \mathcal{F} . Its proof is a classical application of Dudley's chaining method (see, e.g., [45]).

Proposition 3.2 (Bounding Laplacian complexity with Dudley's entropy integral). Suppose that (Ω, ρ) is a metric space and \mathcal{F} is a set of functions on Ω . Then

$$L_n(\mathcal{F}) \le C \inf_{\alpha > 0} \left(2\alpha + \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \int_{\alpha}^{\infty} \sqrt{\log \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty})} \mathrm{d}u + \frac{1}{n} \int_{\alpha}^{\infty} \log \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) \mathrm{d}u \right)$$

where $\mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty})$ is the covering number of \mathcal{F} and C > 0 is an absolute constant.

In particular, we are interested in the case where \mathcal{F} is the class of all the bounded Lipschitz functions. One can find the result in [41] or more explicit bound in [26] that for the set \mathcal{F} of functions f with $||f||_{\text{Lip}} \leq 1$, its covering number satisfies

$$\mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) \le \left(\frac{8}{u}\right)^{\mathcal{N}(\Omega, u/2, \rho)}$$

When $\Omega = [0, 1]^d$, a better bound on the covering number for Lipschitz functions is available from [41, 48]:

$$\mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) \le \left(2\left\lceil 2/u\right\rceil + 1\right) 2^{\mathcal{N}\left([0,1]^{d}, u/2, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}\right)},$$

which implies the following corollary.

Corollary 3.3 (Laplacian complexity for Lipschitz functions on the hypercube). Let $\Omega = [0, 1]^d$ with the $\|\cdot\|_{\infty}$ metric, and \mathcal{F} be the set of all Lipschitz functions f on Ω with $\|f\|_{\text{Lip}} \leq 1$. We have

$$L_n(\mathcal{F}) \le \begin{cases} Cn^{-1/2} & \text{if } d = 1, \\ C\log n \cdot n^{-1/2} & \text{if } d = 2, \\ Cd^{-1}n^{-1/d} & \text{if } d \ge 3. \end{cases}$$

Discrete Laplacian complexity. Laplacian complexity can be useful for differential privacy algorithms based on the Laplacian mechanism [24]. However, since PSMM perturbs counts in each subregion, it is more convenient for us to add integer noise to the true counts. Instead, we will use the *worst-case discrete Laplacian complexity* defined below:

$$\widetilde{L}_{n}(\mathcal{F}) := \sup_{X_{1},\dots,X_{n}\in\Omega} \mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}} \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_{i} f(X_{i}) \right| \right],$$
(3.2)

where $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_n \sim Lap_{\mathbb{Z}}(1)$ are i.i.d. discrete Laplacian random variables.

In particular, $Lap_{\mathbb{Z}}(1)$ has a bounded sub-exponential norm, therefore the proof of Proposition 3.2 works for discrete Laplacian random variables as well. Consequently, Corollary 3.3 also holds for $\tilde{L}_n(\mathcal{F})$, with a different absolute constant C.

3.2. **Privacy and Accuracy of Algorithm 1.** The privacy guarantee of Algorithm 1 can be proved by checking the definition. The essence of the proof is the same as the classical Laplacian mechanism [24].

Proposition 3.4 (Privacy of Algorithm 1). Algorithm 1 is ε -differentially private.

We now turn to accuracy. The linear programming problem stated in Algorithm 2 has $(2m^2 + 2m)$ many variables and (m+1) many constraints, which can be solved in polynomial time in m. We first show that Algorithm 2 indeed outputs the closest probability measure to ν in the $d_{\rm BL}$ -distance in the next proposition.

Proposition 3.5. For a discrete signed measure ν on Ω , Algorithm 2 gives its closest probability measure in d_{BL} -distance with the same support set with a polynomial running time in m.

Now we are ready to analyze the accuracy of Algorithm 1. In PSMM, independent Laplacian noise is added to the count of each sub-region. Therefore, the Laplacian complexity arises when considering the expected Wasserstein distance between the original empirical measure and the synthetic measure.

Theorem 3.6 (Accuracy of Algorithm 1). Suppose $(\Omega_1, \ldots, \Omega_m)$ is a partition of (Ω, ρ) and \mathcal{F} is the set of all functions with Lipschitz norm bounded by 1. Then the measure $\hat{\nu}$ generated from Algorithm 1 satisfies

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \hat{\nu}) \leq \max_i \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_i) + \frac{2m}{\varepsilon n} \widetilde{L}_m(\mathcal{F}).$$

Note that $\operatorname{diam}(\Omega_i) \simeq m^{-1/d}$ can be satisfied when we take a partition of $\Omega = [0, 1]^d$ where each Ω_i is a subcube of the same size. Using the formula above and the result of Laplacian complexity for the hypercube in Corollary 3.3, one can easily deduce the following result.

Corollary 3.7 (Accuracy of Algorithm 1 on the hypercube). Take $m = \lceil \varepsilon n \rceil$ and let $(\Omega_1, \ldots, \Omega_m)$ be a partition of $\Omega = [0, 1]^d$ with the norm $\| \cdot \|_{\infty}$. Assume that $\operatorname{diam}(\Omega_i) \simeq m^{-1/d}$. Then the measure $\hat{\nu}$ generated from Algorithm 1 satisfies

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \hat{\nu}) \leq \begin{cases} C(\varepsilon n)^{-\frac{1}{2}} & \text{if } d = 1, \\ C\log(\varepsilon n)(\varepsilon n)^{-\frac{1}{2}} & \text{if } d = 2, \\ C(\varepsilon n)^{-\frac{1}{d}} & \text{if } d \geq 3. \end{cases}$$

4. PRIVATE MEASURE MECHANISM (PMM)

4.1. Binary partition and noisy counts. A binary hierarchical partition of a set Ω of depth r is a family of subsets Ω_{θ} indexed by $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^{\leq r}$, where

$$\{0,1\}^{\leq k} = \{0,1\}^0 \sqcup \{0,1\}^1 \sqcup \cdots \sqcup \{0,1\}^k, \quad k = 0,1,2\dots,$$

and such that Ω_{θ} is partitioned into $\Omega_{\theta 0}$ and $\Omega_{\theta 1}$ for every $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^{\leq r-1}$. By convention, the cube $\{0, 1\}^0$ consists of a single element \emptyset . We usually drop the subscript \emptyset and write n instead of n_{\emptyset} . When $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^j$, we call j the *level* of θ . We can also encode a binary hierarchical partition of Ω in a binary tree of depth r, where the root is labeled Ω and the j-th level of the tree encodes the subsets Ω_{θ} for θ at level j.

Let $(\Omega_{\theta})_{\theta \in \{0,1\} \leq r}$ be a binary partition of Ω . Given true data $(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \Omega^n$, the *true count* n_{θ} is the number of data points in the region Ω_{θ} , i.e.

$$n_{\theta} \coloneqq \left| \left\{ i \in [n] : x_i \in \Omega_{\theta} \right\} \right|$$

We will convert true counts into *noisy counts* n'_{θ} by adding Laplacian noise; all regions on the same level will receive noise of the same expected magnitude. Formally, we set

$$n'_{\theta} \coloneqq (n_{\theta} + \lambda_{\theta})_{+}, \text{ where } \lambda_{\theta} \sim \operatorname{Lap}_{\mathbb{Z}}(\sigma_{j}),$$

and $j \in \{0, ..., r\}$ is the level of θ . At this point, the magnitudes of the noise σ_j can be arbitrary.

4.2. Consistency. The true counts n_{θ} are non-negative and *consistent*, i.e., the counts of subregions always add up to the count of the region:

$$n_{\theta 0} + n_{\theta 1} = n_{\theta}$$
 for all $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^{\leq r-1}$.

The noisy counts n'_{θ} are non-negative, but not necessarily consistent. Algorithm 3 enforces consistency by adjusting the counts iteratively, from top to bottom. In the case of the deficit, when the sum of the two subregional counts is smaller than the count of the region, we increase both subregional counts. In the opposite case or surplus, we decrease both subregional counts. Apart from this requirement, we are free to distribute the deficit or surplus between the subregional counts.

It is convenient to state this requirement by considering a *product partial order* on \mathbb{Z}^2_+ , where we declare that $(a_0, a_1) \leq (b_0, b_1)$ if and only if $a_0 \leq b_0$ and $a_1 \leq b_1$. We call the two vectors $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}^2$ comparable if either $a \leq b$ or $b \leq a$. Furthermore, L(a) denotes the line x + y = a on the plane.

At each step, Algorithm 3 uses a transformation $f_{\theta} : \mathbb{Z}_{+}^{2} \to \mathbb{Z}_{+}^{2} \cap L(m_{\theta})$. It can be chosen arbitrarily; the only requirement is that $f_{\theta}(x)$ be comparable with x. The comparability requirement is natural and non-restrictive. For example, the *uniform* transformation selects the closest point in the discrete interval $\mathbb{Z}_{+}^{2} \cap L(m_{\theta})$ in (say) the Euclidean metric. Alternatively, the *proportional* transformation selects the point in the discrete interval $\mathbb{Z}_{+}^{2} \cap L(m_{\theta})$ in (say) the Euclidean metric. Alternatively, the *proportional* transformation selects the point in the discrete interval $\mathbb{Z}_{+}^{2} \cap L(m_{\theta})$ that is closest to the line that connects the input vector and the origin.

Algorithm 3 Consistency

Input: non-negative numbers $(n'_{\theta})_{\theta \in \{0,1\} \leq r}$, where n' is a nonnegative integer. set $m \coloneqq n'$. for $j = 0, \ldots, r - 1$ do for $\theta \in \{0,1\}^j$ do transform the vector $(n'_{\theta 0}, n'_{\theta 1}) \in \mathbb{Z}^2_+$ into any comparable vector $(m_{\theta 0}, m_{\theta 1}) \in \mathbb{Z}^2_+ \cap L(m_{\theta})$. end for end for Output: non-negative integers $(m_{\theta})_{\theta \in \{0,1\} \leq r}$.

4.3. Synthetic data. Algorithm 3 ensures that the output counts m_{θ} are non-negative, integer, and consistent. They are also private since they are a function of the noisy counts n'_{θ} , which are private as we proved. Therefore, the counts m_{θ} can be used to generate *private synthetic data* by putting m_{θ} points in cell Ω_{θ} . Algorithm 4 makes this formal.

Algorithm 4 Private Measure Mechanism

Input: true data X = (x₁,...,x_n) ∈ Ωⁿ, noise magnitudes σ₀,...,σ_r > 0.
Compute true counts: Let n_θ be the number of data points in Ω_θ.
Add noise: Let n'_θ := (n_θ + λ_θ)₊, where λ_θ ~ Lap_Z(σ_j) are i.i.d. random variables,
Enforce consistency: Convert the noisy counts (n'_θ) to consistent counts (m_θ) using Algorithm 3.
Sample: Choose any m_θ points in each cell Ω_θ, θ ∈ {0,1}^r independently of X.
Output: the set of all these points as synthetic data Y = (y₁,...,y_m) ∈ Ω^m.

4.4. **Privacy and accuracy of Algorithm 4.** We first prove that Algorithm 4 is differentially private. The proof idea is similar to the classic Laplacian mechanism. But now our noise is of differential scale for each level, so more delicate calculations are needed.

Theorem 4.1 (Privacy of Algorithm 4). The vector of noisy counts $(n_{\theta} + \lambda_{\theta})$ in Algorithm 4 is ε -differentially private, where

$$\varepsilon = \sum_{j=0}^{r} \frac{1}{\sigma_j}.$$

Consequently, the synthetic data \mathcal{Y} generated by Algorithm 4 is ε -differentially private.

Having analyzed the privacy of the synthetic data, we now turn to its accuracy. It is determined by the magnitudes of the noise σ_j and by the multiscale geometry of the domain Ω . The latter is captured by the diameters of the regions Ω_{θ} , specifically by their sum at each level, which we denote

$$\Delta_j \coloneqq \sum_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^j} \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_\theta) \tag{4.1}$$

and adopt the notation $\Delta_{-1} := \Delta_0 = \operatorname{diam}(\Omega)$. In addition to Δ_j , the accuracy is affected by the *resolution* of the partition, which is the maximum diameter of the cells, denoted by

$$\delta \coloneqq \max_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^r} \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_\theta).$$

Theorem 4.2 (Accuracy of Algorithm 4). Algorithm 4 that transforms true data \mathcal{X} into synthetic data \mathcal{Y} has the following expected accuracy in the Wasserstein metric:

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \le \frac{2\sqrt{2}}{n} \sum_{j=0}^r \sigma_j \Delta_{j-1} + \delta.$$

Here μ_X and μ_y are the empirical probability distributions on the true and synthetic data, respectively.

The privacy and accuracy guarantees of Algorithm 4 (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) hold for any choice of noise levels σ_i . By optimizing σ_i , we can achieve the best accuracy for a given level of privacy.

Theorem 4.3 (Optimized accuracy). With the optimal choice of magnitude levels (A.4), Algorithm 4 that transforms true data \mathcal{X} into synthetic data \mathcal{Y} is ε -differential private, and has the following expected accuracy in the 1-Wasserstein distance:

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \leq \frac{\sqrt{2}}{\varepsilon n} \Big(\sum_{j=0}^r \sqrt{\Delta_{j-1}}\Big)^2 + \delta.$$

Here μ_{χ} and μ_{χ} are the empirical measures of the true and synthetic data, respectively.

Corollary 4.4 (Optimized accuracy for hypercubes). When $\Omega = [0, 1]^d$ equipped with the ℓ^{∞} metric, with the optimal choice of magnitude levels (A.4) and the optimal choice of

$$r = \begin{cases} \log_2(\varepsilon n) - 1 & \text{if } d = 1, \\ \log_2(\varepsilon n) & \text{if } d \ge 2, \end{cases}$$

we have

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \lesssim \begin{cases} \frac{\log^2(\varepsilon n)}{\varepsilon n}, & \text{if } d = 1, \\ (\varepsilon n)^{-1/d}, & \text{if } d \ge 2. \end{cases}$$

Remark 4.5 (Computational efficiency of Algorithm 4). Since a binary hierarchical partition has 2^r cells in total, the running time of Algorithm 4 is $O(2^r)$. When $\Omega = [0, 1]^d$, with the same optimal choice of r in Corollary 4.4, the running time of PMM becomes $O(\varepsilon dn)$.

4.5. **Proof of Theorem 4.2.** For the proof of Theorem 4.2, we introduce a quantitative notion for the incomparability of two vectors on the plane. For vectors $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}^2_+$, we define

$$flux(a,b) := \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } a \text{ and } b \text{ are comparable,} \\ \min\left(\left|a_1 - b_1\right|, \left|a_2 - b_2\right|\right) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Lemma 4.6 (Flux as incomparability). flux(a, b) is the ℓ_{∞} -distance from a to the set of points that are comparable to b.

For example, if a = (1, 9) and b = (6, 7), then flux(a, b) = 2. Note that a has a distance 2 to the vector (1, 7) which is comparable with b.

Lemma 4.7 (Flux as transfer). Suppose we have two bins with a_1 and a_2 balls in them. Then one can achieve b_1 and b_2 balls in these bins by:

- (a) first making the total number of balls correct by adding a total of $(b_1 + b_2) (a_1 a_2)$ balls to the two bins (or removing, if that number is negative);
- (b) then transferring flux $((a_1, a_2), (b_1, b_2))$ balls from one bin to the other.

For example, suppose that one bin has 1 ball and the other has 9. Then we can achieve 6 and 7 balls in these bins by first adding 3 balls to the first bin and transferring 2 balls from the second to the first bin. As we noted above, 2 is the flux between the vectors (1,9) and b = (6,7).

Lemma 4.7 can be generalized to the hierarchical binary partition of Ω as follows.

Lemma 4.8. Consider any data set $\mathcal{X} \in \Omega^n$, and let $(n_{\theta})_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^r}$ be its counts. Consider any consistent vector of non-negative integers $(m_{\theta})_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^r}$. Then one can transform \mathcal{X} into a set $\mathcal{Z} \in \Omega^m$ that has counts $(m_{\theta})_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^r}$ by:

- (a) first making the total number of points correct by adding a total of m n points to Ω (or remove, if that number is negative);
- (b) then transferring flux $((n_{\theta 0}, n_{\theta 1}), (m_{\theta 0}, m_{\theta 1}))$ points from $\Omega_{\theta 0}$ to $\Omega_{\theta 1}$ or vice versa, for all $j = 0, \ldots, r 1$ and $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^j$.

Combining the concept of the flux and our algorithm, the following two lemmas are useful in the proof of Theorem 4.2.

Lemma 4.9. In Algorithm 4, we have

$$\operatorname{flux}\left((n_{\theta 0}, n_{\theta 1}), (m_{\theta 0}, m_{\theta 1})\right) \leq \max\left(|\lambda_{\theta 0}|, |\lambda_{\theta 1}|\right)$$

for all j = 0, ..., r - 1 and $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^j$.

Lemma 4.10. For any finite multisets $U \subset V$ such that all elements in U are from Ω , one has

$$W_1(\mu_U, \mu_V) \le \frac{|V \setminus U|}{|V|} \cdot \operatorname{diam}(\Omega).$$

Proof. (*Proof of Theorem 4.2*) Owing to Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.9, the creation of synthetic data from the true data $\mathcal{X} \mapsto \mathcal{Y}$, described by Algorithm 4, can be achieved by the following three steps.

- 1. Transform the *n*-point input set \mathcal{X} to an *m*-point set \mathcal{X}_1 by adding or removing |m n| points.
- 2. Transform \mathcal{X}_1 to \mathcal{X}_2 by moving at most max $(|\lambda_{\theta 0}|, |\lambda_{\theta 1}|)$ many data points for each j = 0, 1, ..., r 1 and $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^j$ between the two parts of the region Ω_{θ} .
- 3. Transforms \mathcal{X}_2 to the output data \mathcal{Y} by relocating points within their cells.

We will analyze the accuracy of these steps one at a time.

Analyzing Step 2. The total distance the points are moved at this step is bounded by

$$\sum_{j=0}^{r-1} \sum_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^j} \max\left(\left| \lambda_{\theta 0} \right|, \left| \lambda_{\theta 1} \right| \right) \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_{\theta}) \eqqcolon D.$$
(4.2)

Since $|\mathcal{X}_1| = m$, it follows that

$$W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}_1}, \mu_{\mathcal{X}_2}) \le \frac{D}{m}.$$
(4.3)

Combining Steps 1 and 2. Recall that step 1 transforms the input data \mathcal{X} with $|\mathcal{X}| = n$ into \mathcal{X}_1 with $|\mathcal{X}_1| = m = n + \operatorname{sign}(\lambda) \cdot \lfloor |\lambda| \rfloor$ by adding or removing points, depending on the sign of λ .

Case 1: $\lambda \ge 0$. Here \mathcal{X}_1 is obtained from \mathcal{X} by adding $\lfloor \lambda \rfloor$ points, so Lemma 4.10 gives

$$W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}},\mu_{\mathcal{X}_1}) \leq \frac{\lambda}{m} \cdot \Delta_0.$$

Combining this with (4.3) by triangle inequality, we conclude that

$$W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}},\mu_{\mathcal{X}_2}) \le \frac{\lambda \Delta_0 + D}{m} \le \frac{\lambda \Delta_0 + D}{n}.$$

Case 2: $\lambda < 0$. Here \mathcal{X}_1 is obtained from \mathcal{X} by removing a set \mathcal{X}_0 of $n - m = ||\lambda||$ points. Furthermore, by our analysis of step 2, \mathcal{X}_2 is obtained from \mathcal{X}_1 by moving points the total distance at most D. Therefore, $\mathcal{X}_2 \cup \mathcal{X}_0$ (as a multiset) is obtained from $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}_1 \cup \mathcal{X}_0$ by moving points the total distance at most D, too. (The points in \mathcal{X}_0 remain unmoved.) Since $|\mathcal{X}| = n$, it follows that

$$W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{X}_2 \cup \mathcal{X}_0}) \le \frac{D}{n}.$$

Moreover, Lemma 4.10 gives

$$W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}_2}, \mu_{\mathcal{X}_2 \cup \mathcal{X}_0}) \le \frac{|\mathcal{X}_0|}{|\mathcal{X}_2 \cup \mathcal{X}_0|} \cdot \operatorname{diam}(\Omega) \le \frac{|\lambda| \Delta_0}{n}.$$

(Here we used that the multiset $\mathcal{X}_2 \cup \mathcal{X}_0$ has the same number of points as \mathcal{X} , which is *n*.) Combining the two bounds by triangle inequality, we obtain

$$W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{X}_2}) \le \frac{|\lambda| \,\Delta_0 + D}{n}.\tag{4.4}$$

In other words, this bound holds in both cases.

Analyzing Step 3. This step is the easiest to analyze: since \mathcal{Y} is obtained from \mathcal{X}_2 by relocating the points are relocated within their cells, and the maximal diameter of the cells is δ , we have $W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}_2}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \leq \delta$. Combining this with (4.4) by triangle inequality, we conclude that

$$W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}},\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \le \frac{|\lambda|\Delta_0 + D}{n} + \delta$$

Taking expectation. Recall the definition of D from (4.2). We get

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \leq \frac{1}{n} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[|\lambda| \right] \Delta_0 + \sum_{j=0}^{r-1} \sum_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^j} \mathbb{E} \left[\max \left(|\lambda_{\theta 0}|, |\lambda_{\theta 1}| \right) \right] \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_\theta) \right] + \delta.$$

Since $\lambda \sim \text{Lap}_{\mathbb{Z}}(\sigma_0)$, by (B.1) we have $\mathbb{E}\left[|\lambda|\right] \leq (\mathbb{E}(\lambda)^2)^{1/2} \leq \sqrt{2}\sigma_0$. Similarly, since $\lambda_{\theta 0}$ and $\lambda_{\theta 1}$ are independent $\text{Lap}_{\mathbb{Z}}(\sigma_{j+1})$ random variables, $\mathbb{E}\left[\max\left(|\lambda_{\theta 0}|, |\lambda_{\theta 1}|\right)\right] \leq 2\sqrt{2}\sigma_{j+1}$. Substituting these estimates and rearranging the terms of the sum will complete the proof.

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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL PROOFS

A.1. Proof of Proposition 3.2.

Proof. We will apply the chaining argument (see, e.g., [45, Chapter 8]) to deduce a bound similar to Dudley's inequality.

Step 1: (Finding nets)

Define $\varepsilon_j = 2^{-j}$ for $j \in \mathbb{Z}$ and consider an ε_j -net T_j of \mathcal{F} of size $\mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, \varepsilon_j, \|\cdot\|_{\infty})$. Then for any $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and any level j, we can find the closest element in the net, denoted $\pi_j(f)$. In other words, there exists $\pi_j(f)$ s.t.

$$\pi_j(f) \in T_j, \quad \|f - \pi_j(f)\|_{\infty} \le \varepsilon_j.$$

Let m be a positive integer to be determined later, we have the telescope sum together with triangle inequality

$$\mathbb{E}\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}}\frac{1}{n}\left|\sum_{i=1}^{n}f(X_{i})\lambda_{i}\right| \leq \mathbb{E}\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}}\frac{1}{n}\left|\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(f-\pi_{m}(f)\right)\left(X_{i}\right)\cdot\lambda_{i}\right| + \sum_{j=j_{0}+1}^{m}\mathbb{E}\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}}\frac{1}{n}\left|\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\pi_{j}(f)-\pi_{j-1}(f)\right)\left(X_{i}\right)\cdot\lambda_{i}\right|.$$

Note that when $j = j_0$ is small enough, Ω can be covered by $\pi_{j_0}(f) \equiv 0$. Step 2: (Bounding the telescoping sum)

For a fixed $j_0 < j \le m$, we consider the quantity

$$\mathbb{E}\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}}\frac{1}{n}\left|\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\pi_{j}(f)-\pi_{j-1}(f)\right)(X_{i})\cdot\lambda_{i}\right|.$$

For simplicity we will denote $a_i = a_i(f)$ as the coefficient $\frac{1}{n} \left(\pi_j(f) - \pi_{j-1}(f) \right) (X_i)$. Then we have

$$|a_i| \le \frac{1}{n} \left\| f - \pi_{j-1}(f) \right\|_{\infty} + \frac{1}{n} \left\| \pi_j(f) - f \right\|_{\infty} \le \frac{1}{n} (\varepsilon_j + \varepsilon_{j-1}) \le \frac{3\varepsilon_j}{n}.$$

Since $\{\lambda_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ are independent subexponential random variables, we can apply Bernstein's inequality to the sum $\sum_i a_i \lambda_i$. Let $K = 3\varepsilon_j$, we have

$$\mathbb{P}\left\{ \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i \lambda_i \right| > t \right\} \le 2 \exp\left[-c \min\left(\frac{t^2}{\|a\|_2^2}, \frac{t}{\|a\|_\infty}\right) \right]$$
$$\le 2 \exp\left[-c \min\left(\frac{t^2}{K^2/n}, \frac{t}{K/n}\right) \right]$$
$$= 2 \exp\left[-cn \min\left(\frac{t^2}{K^2}, \frac{t}{K}\right) \right],$$

Then we can use the union bound to control the supreme. Define $N = |T_j| \cdot |T_{j-1}| \le |T_j|^2$,

$$\mathbb{P}\left\{\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}}\left|\sum_{i=1}^{n}a_{i}\lambda_{i}\right| > t\right\} \leq 2N\exp\left[-cn\min\left(\frac{t^{2}}{K^{2}},\frac{t}{K}\right)\right] \wedge 1$$
$$= 2\exp\left[\log N - cn\min\left(\frac{t^{2}}{K^{2}},\frac{t}{K}\right)\right] \wedge 1$$
$$\leq 2\exp\left(\log N - cn\frac{t^{2}}{K^{2}}\right) \wedge 1$$
$$+ 2\exp\left(\log N - cn\frac{t}{K}\right) \wedge 1$$

and hence

$$\mathbb{E}\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}} \left|\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i \lambda_i\right| = \int_0^\infty 2\exp\left(\log N - cn\frac{t^2}{K^2}\right) \wedge 1dt + \int_0^\infty 2\exp\left(\log N - cn\frac{t}{K}\right) \wedge 1dt$$
$$:= I_2 + I_1.$$

We will compute them separately.

$$I_{1} = \int_{0}^{\infty} 2 \exp\left(\log N - cn\frac{t}{K}\right) \wedge 1dt$$
$$= \frac{K \log N}{cn} + \int_{K \log N/cn}^{\infty} 2 \exp\left(\log N - cn\frac{t}{K}\right)$$
$$= \frac{K \log N}{cn} + \int_{0}^{\infty} 2 \exp\left(-cn\frac{t}{K}\right)$$
$$\leq CK \frac{\log N}{n}$$

$$I_{2} = \int_{0}^{\infty} 2 \exp\left(\log N - cn\frac{t^{2}}{K^{2}}\right) \wedge 1dt$$
$$= \sqrt{\frac{K^{2}\log N}{cn}} + \int_{\sqrt{K^{2}\log N/cn}}^{\infty} 2 \exp\left(\log N - cn\frac{t^{2}}{K^{2}}\right)$$
$$= \sqrt{\frac{K^{2}\log N}{cn}} + \int_{0}^{\infty} 2 \exp\left(-cn\frac{t^{2}}{K^{2}} - 2\sqrt{cn\log N}\frac{t}{K}\right)$$
$$\leq \sqrt{\frac{K^{2}\log N}{cn}} + \frac{K}{\sqrt{cn\log N}}$$
$$\leq CK\sqrt{\frac{\log N}{n}}.$$

Therefore we concluded that for a fixed level j,

$$\mathbb{E}\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}} \left|\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i \lambda_i\right| \le CK \left(\frac{\log N}{n} + \sqrt{\frac{\log N}{n}}\right) \lesssim \varepsilon_j \left(\frac{\log N}{n} + \sqrt{\frac{\log N}{n}}\right)$$

Step 3: (Bounding the last entry) For the last entry in the telescoping sum, similarly, we denote $a_i := \frac{1}{n} (f - \pi_m(f)) (X_i)$ and we have $|a_i| \le \varepsilon_m/n$. Then

$$\sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i \lambda_i \right| \le \frac{\varepsilon_m}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |\lambda_i|,$$

and the expectation satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}}\left|\sum_{i=1}^{n}a_{i}\lambda_{i}\right| \leq \frac{\varepsilon_{m}}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\mathbb{E}\left|\lambda_{i}\right| \lesssim \varepsilon_{m}.$$

Step 4: (Combining the bound and choosing m) Combining the two integrals together, we deduce that for any $X_1, \ldots, X_n \in \Omega$,

$$\mathbb{E}\sup_{f\in\mathcal{F}}\frac{1}{n}\left|\sum_{i=1}^{n}f(X_{i})\lambda_{i}\right| \leq C\left(\varepsilon_{m}+\sum_{j=j_{0}+1}^{m}\varepsilon_{j}\left(\frac{\log\mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F},\varepsilon_{j},\|\cdot\|_{\infty})}{n}+\sqrt{\frac{\log\mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F},\varepsilon_{j},\|\cdot\|_{\infty})}{n}}\right)\right).$$

Then for any $\alpha > 0$, we can always choose m such that $2\alpha \leq \varepsilon_m < 4\alpha$ and bound the sum above with integral

$$\mathbb{E} \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \frac{1}{n} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(X_i) \lambda_i \right| \leq C \left(2\alpha + \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \int_{\alpha}^{\infty} \sqrt{\log \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty})} du + \frac{1}{n} \int_{\alpha}^{\infty} \log \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) du \right).$$
(A.1)

Taking infimum over α completes the proof of the first inequality.

Now assume \mathcal{F} is the set of all functions f with $||f||_{\text{Lip}} \leq 1$. From [26, Lemma 4.2], we can bound the covering number of \mathcal{F} by the covering number of Ω as follows:

$$\log \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) \le \log(8/u) \, \mathcal{N}(\Omega, u/2, \rho).$$

As a result, for any $\alpha > 0$,

$$L_n(\mathcal{F}) \le C\left(2\alpha + \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \int_{\alpha}^{\infty} \sqrt{\log(8/u) \mathcal{N}(\Omega, u/2, \rho)} du + \frac{1}{n} \int_{\alpha}^{\infty} \log(8/u) \mathcal{N}(\Omega, u/2, \rho) du\right).$$

This completes the proof.

This completes the proof.

A.2. Proof of Corollary 3.3.

Proof. For $\Omega = [0,1]^d$ with l_{∞} -norm, we have diam $(\Omega) = 1$ and the covering number

$$\mathcal{N}([0,1]^d, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) \le u^{-d}.$$

Then, as the domain $\Omega = [0,1]^d$ is connected and centered, we can apply the bound for the covering number of \mathcal{F} from [48, Theorem 17]:

$$\mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) \leq \left(2\left\lceil 2/u\right\rceil + 1\right) 2^{\mathcal{N}\left([0,1]^{d}, u/2, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}\right)},$$

$$\Longrightarrow \log \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) \lesssim \mathcal{N}(\Omega, u/2, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) \lesssim (u/2)^{-d}.$$

Applying the inequality above to (A.1), we get

$$L_n \le C\left(2\alpha + \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\int_{\alpha}^{\infty} (u/2)^{-d/2} \mathrm{d}u + \frac{1}{n}\int_{\alpha}^{\infty} (u/2)^{-d} \mathrm{d}u\right). \tag{A.2}$$

Compute the integral for the case d = 2 and $d \ge 3$,

$$L_{n}(f) \leq \begin{cases} C\left(2\alpha + \frac{2}{\sqrt{n}}\log\frac{2}{\alpha} + \frac{2}{n}\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right)^{-1}\right) & \text{if } d = 2. \\ C\left(2\alpha + \frac{2}{\sqrt{n}} \cdot \frac{1}{\frac{d}{2} - 1}\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right)^{1 - \frac{d}{2}} + \frac{2}{n} \cdot \frac{1}{d - 1}\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right)^{1 - d}\right) & \text{if } d \geq 3. \end{cases}$$

Choosing $\alpha = 2n^{-1/d}$ finishes the cases for $d \ge 2$.

When d = 1, the Dudley integral in (A.2) is divergent. However, note that $\operatorname{diam}(\mathcal{F}) \leq 2$ and hence $\log \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}, u, \|\cdot\|_{\infty}) = 0$ for u > 1. From (A.1), we have

$$L_n(\mathcal{F}) \le C\left(2\alpha + \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \int_{\alpha}^{1} (u/2)^{-1/2} \mathrm{d}u + \frac{1}{n} \int_{\alpha}^{1} (u/2)^{-1} \mathrm{d}u\right)$$
$$\le C\left(2\alpha + \frac{2(\sqrt{2} - \sqrt{\alpha})}{\sqrt{n}} + \frac{2}{n} \log \frac{1}{\alpha}\right).$$

The optimal choice of α is $\alpha \sim n^{-1/2}$, which gives us the result for d = 1.

A.3. Proof of Proposition 3.4.

Proof. It suffices to prove that the steps from \mathcal{X} to the sign measure ν in Algorithm 1 is ε -differentially private since the remaining steps are only based on ν . Notice that both $\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}, \nu$ are supported on Y_1, \ldots, Y_m , we can identify the two discrete measures as m dimensional vectors in the standard simplex, denoted $\overline{\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}}, \overline{\nu}$, respectively. Consider two data sets \mathcal{X}_1 and \mathcal{X}_2 differ in one point. Suppose we deduced $\mu_{\mathcal{Y}_1}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}_2}$ and ν_1, ν_2 through the first four steps of Algorithm 1 from $\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{X}_2$, respectively. We know two vectors $\overline{\mu_{\mathcal{Y}_1}}, \overline{\mu_{\mathcal{Y}_2}}$ are different at one coordinate, where the difference is bounded by 1/n.

Then

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}\left\{\nu_{1}=\eta\right\}}{\mathbb{P}\left\{\nu_{2}=\eta\right\}} = \prod_{i=1}^{m} \frac{\mathbb{P}\left\{\lambda_{i}=n(\eta-\overline{\mu}\overline{y_{1}})_{i}\right\}}{\mathbb{P}\left\{\lambda_{i}=n(\eta-\overline{\mu}\overline{y_{2}})_{i}\right\}} = \prod_{i=1}^{m} \frac{\exp(-\varepsilon n|(\eta-\overline{\mu}\overline{y_{1}})_{i}|)}{\exp(-\varepsilon n|(\eta-\overline{\mu}\overline{y_{2}})_{i}|)} \le \exp\left(\varepsilon n\|\mu y_{2}-\mu y_{1}\|_{1}\right) \le e^{\varepsilon}.$$

By writing $\mathbb{P}\left\{\nu_i \in S\right\} = \sum_{\eta \in S} \mathbb{P}\left\{\nu_i = \eta\right\}$ for i = 1, 2, the inequality above implies Algorithm 1 is ε -differentially private.

A.4. Proof of Proposition 3.5.

Proof. For two signed measures τ, ν supported on \mathcal{Y} , the $d_{\rm BL}$ -distance between τ and ν is

$$d_{\rm BL}(\tau,\nu) = \sup_{\|f\|_{\rm Lip} \le 1} \left| \sum_{i=1}^m f(y_i) \left(\tau(\{y_i\}) - \nu(\{y_i\}) \right) \right|.$$

For simplicity, we denote $f_i = f(y_i)$, $\nu_i = \nu(\{y_i\})$ and $\tau_i = \tau(\{y_i\})$. Then we note that for any f with $||f||_{\text{Lip}} \leq 1$, only $(f_i)_{i \in [m]}$ matters in the definition above. Therefore, suppose ν and τ are fixed, computing the d_{BL} -distance is equivalent to the following linear programming problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_{i=1}^{m} (\nu_i - \tau_i) f_i \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & f_i - f_j \leq \|y_i - y_j\|_{\infty}, \\ & - f_i + f_j \leq \|y_i - y_j\|_{\infty}, \\ & - 1 \leq f_i \leq 1, \end{aligned} \qquad \qquad \forall i, j \leq m, i \neq j, \\ & \forall i, j \leq m, i \neq j, \\ & \forall i \leq m. \end{aligned}$$

After a change of variable $f'_i = f_i + 1$, we can rewrite it as

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{m} (\nu_{i} - \tau_{i}) f'_{i} - (\nu(\Omega) - 1)$$
s.t. $f'_{i} - f'_{j} \leq ||y_{i} - y_{j}||_{\infty}, \qquad \forall i, j \leq m, i \neq j,$
 $-f'_{i} + f'_{j} \leq ||y_{i} - y_{j}||_{\infty}, \qquad \forall i, j \leq m, i \neq j,$
 $0 \leq f'_{i} \leq 2, \qquad \forall i \leq m.$

Next, we can consider the dual problem of the linear programming problem above. The duality theory in linear programming [44, Chapter 12] showed that the original problem and the dual problem have the same optimal solution. Let $u_{ij}, u'_{ij} \ge 0$ be the dual variable for the linear constraints about $f'_i - f'_j$ and $-f'_i + f'_j$, and let $v_i \ge 0$ be the dual variable for the equation $f'_i \le 2$. As the linear programming above is in the standard form, by the duality theory, it is equivalent to

$$\min \sum_{i \neq j} \|y_i - y_j\|_{\infty} (u_{ij} + u'_{ij}) + 2v_i - (\nu(\Omega) - 1)$$
s.t.
$$\sum_{j \neq i} (u_{ij} - u'_{ij}) + v_i \ge \nu_i - \tau_i, \qquad \forall i \le m,$$

$$u_{ij}, u'_{ij}, v_i \ge 0 \qquad \forall i, j \le m, i \ne j.$$

To find the minimizer τ for a given ν , we regard τ_i as variables and add the constraints of τ being a probability measure. Also, we can eliminate the constant $\nu(\Omega) - 1$ in the target function. So we get the linear programming problem:

$$\begin{split} \min & \sum_{i \neq j} \|y_i - y_j\|_{\infty} (u_{ij} + u'_{ij}) + 2 \, v_i \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum_{j \neq i} (u_{ij} - u'_{ij}) + v_i + \tau_i \geq \nu_i, \\ & \sum_{i=1}^m \tau_i = 1, \\ & u_{ij}, u'_{ij}, v_i, \tau_i \geq 0 \end{split} \quad \forall i, j \leq m, i \neq j. \end{split}$$

There are $2m^2$ variables in total and m+1 linear constraints, and the minimizer $(\tau_i)_{i=1}^m$ is what we want.

A.5. Proof of Theorem 3.6.

Proof. We transformed the original data measure $\mu_{\mathcal{X}}$ with three steps: $\mu_{\mathcal{X}} \longrightarrow \mu_{\mathcal{Y}} \longrightarrow \nu \longrightarrow \hat{\nu}$. **Step 1:** For the first step in the algorithm, we have $W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \le \max_i \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_i)$. This follows from the definition of 1-Wasserstein distance.

Step 2: In this step, ν is no longer a probability measure, and we consider $d_{\rm BL}(\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}, \nu)$ instead:

$$\mathbb{E}d_{\mathrm{BL}}(\mu \mathcal{Y}, \nu) = \mathbb{E} \sup_{\|f\|_{\mathrm{Lip}} \le 1} \left| \int f \mathrm{d}\mu \mathcal{Y} - \int f \mathrm{d}\nu \right|$$
$$= \mathbb{E} \sup_{\|f\|_{\mathrm{Lip}} \le 1} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{m} f(y_i) \left(\frac{n_i}{n} + \frac{\lambda_i}{n} - \frac{n_i}{n} \right) \right| = \frac{m}{\varepsilon n} \widetilde{L}_m(\mathcal{F}).$$
(A.3)

Step 3: For the last step, we have $d_{\rm BL}(\nu, \hat{\nu}) \leq d_{\rm BL}(\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}, \nu)$ because $\hat{\nu}$ is the closest probability measure to ν from Proposition 3.5. As a result, we have

$$W_{1}(\mu,\hat{\nu}) = d_{\mathrm{BL}}(\mu,\hat{\nu}) \leq d_{\mathrm{BL}}(\mu_{\mathcal{X}},\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) + d_{\mathrm{BL}}(\mu_{\mathcal{Y}},\nu) + d_{\mathrm{BL}}(\nu,\hat{\nu})$$
$$\leq W_{1}(\mu_{\mathcal{X}},\mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) + 2d_{\mathrm{BL}}(\mu_{\mathcal{Y}},\nu) \leq \max_{i} \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_{i}) + 2d_{\mathrm{BL}}(\mu_{\mathcal{Y}},\nu).$$

After taking the expectation, we can apply (A.3) to get the desired inequality.

A.6. Proof of Corollary 3.7.

Proof. Using Theorem 3.6, we have

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \hat{\nu}) \leq \max_i \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_i) + \frac{2m}{\varepsilon n} \widetilde{L}_m(\mathcal{F}).$$

By assumption we have $\max_i \operatorname{diam}(\Omega_i) \simeq m^{-1/d} \simeq (\varepsilon n)^{-1/d}$. And by 3.3 we have the bound for the Laplacian complexity

$$\widetilde{L}_m(\mathcal{F}) \leq \begin{cases} C(\varepsilon n)^{-1/2} & \text{if } d = 1, \\ C\log n \cdot (\varepsilon n)^{-1/2} & \text{if } d = 2, \\ C(\varepsilon n)^{-1/d} & \text{if } d \ge 3. \end{cases}$$

When $d \ge 3$, the two terms are comparable. And when d = 1, 2, the Laplacian complexity dominates the error. Combining the two inequalities gives the result.

A.7. **Proof of Theorem 4.1.** Theorem 4.1 can be obtained by applying the parallel composition lemma [24]. Here we present a self-contained proof by considering an inhomogeneous version of the classical Laplacian mechanism [24].

Lemma A.1 (Inhomogeneous Laplace mechanism). Let $F : \Omega^n \to \mathbb{R}^k$ be any map, $s = (s_i)_{i=1}^k \in \mathbb{R}^k_+$ be a fixed vector, and $\lambda = (\lambda_i)_{i=1}^k$ be a random vector with independent coordinates $\lambda_i \sim \text{Lap}_{\mathbb{Z}}(s_i)$. Then the map $x \mapsto F(x) + \lambda$ is ε -differentially private, where

$$\varepsilon = \sup_{x,\tilde{x}} \left\| F(x) - F(\tilde{x}) \right\|_{\ell^1(s)}.$$

Here the supremum is over all pairs of input vectors in Ω^n that differ in one coordinate, and $||z||_{\ell^1(s)} = \sum_{i=1}^k |z_i| / s_i$.

Proof of Lemma A.1. Suppose $x, \tilde{x} \in \Omega^n$ differs in exactly one coordinate. Consider the density functions of the inputs having the same output $y = F(x) + \lambda = F(\tilde{x}) + \tilde{\lambda} \in \mathbb{Z}^k$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathbb{P}\left\{F(x) + \lambda = y\right\}}{\mathbb{P}\left\{F(\tilde{x}) + \tilde{\lambda} = y\right\}} &= \frac{\mathbb{P}\left\{\lambda = y - F(x)\right\}}{\mathbb{P}\left\{\tilde{\lambda} = y - F(\tilde{x})\right\}} \\ &= \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{k} \exp\left(-\frac{|(y - F(x))_i|}{s_i}\right)}{\prod_{i=1}^{k} \exp\left(-\frac{|(y - F(\tilde{x}))_i|}{s_i}\right)} \\ &= \exp\left(-\sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{1}{s_i}\left(|(y - F(x))_i| - |(y - F(\tilde{x}))_i|\right)\right) \\ &\leq \exp\left(||F(x) - F(\tilde{x})||_{\ell^1(s)}\right) \\ &\leq e^{\varepsilon} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we know $x \mapsto F(x) + \lambda$ is ε -differentially private.

Proof of Theorem 4.1. Consider the map $F(\mathcal{X}) = (n_{\theta})$ that transforms the input data into the vector of counts. Suppose a pair of input data \mathcal{X} and $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}$ differ in one point x_i . Consider the corresponding vectors of counts (n_{θ}) and (\tilde{n}_{θ}) . For each level $j = 0, \ldots, r$, the vectors of counts differ for a single $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^j$, namely for the θ that corresponds to the region Ω_{θ} containing x_i . Moreover, whenever such a difference occurs, we have $|n_{\theta} - \tilde{n}_{\theta}| = 1$. Thus, extending the vector $(\sigma_j)_{j=0}^r$ to $(\sigma_{\theta})_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^{\leq r}}$ trivially (by converting σ_j to σ_{θ} for all $\theta \in \{0,1\}^j$), we have

$$\left\|F(\mathcal{X}) - F(\tilde{\mathcal{X}})\right\|_{\ell^{1}(\sigma)} = \sum_{j=0}^{r} \frac{1}{\sigma_{j}} \sum_{\theta \in \{0,1\}^{j}} |n_{\theta} - \tilde{n}_{\theta}| = \sum_{j=0}^{r} \frac{1}{\sigma_{j}} = \varepsilon.$$

Applying Lemma A.1, we conclude that the map $\mathcal{X} \mapsto (n_{\theta} + \lambda_{\theta})$ is ε -differentially private.

A.8. Proof of Theorem 4.3.

Proof. We will use the Lagrange multipliers procedure to find the optimal choices of σ_j . Given the maximal layer r, recall Theorem 4.1, we should use our privacy budget as

$$\varepsilon = \sum_{j=0}^{r} \frac{1}{\sigma_j}.$$

Therefore, we aim to minimize the accuracy bound with the specified privacy budget, namely

$$\min \mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \quad \text{ s.t. } \varepsilon = \sum_{j=0}^r \frac{1}{\sigma_j}.$$

Recall the result in Theorem 4.2. Here ε , *n* are given and δ is fixed as long as we determine the maximal level *r*. So the minimization problem is

$$\min \sum_{j=0}^{r} \sigma_j \Delta_{j-1} \quad \text{s.t. } \varepsilon = \sum_{j=0}^{r} \frac{1}{\sigma_j}.$$

Consider the Lagrangian function

$$f(\sigma_0, \dots, \sigma_r; t) := \sum_{j=0}^r \sigma_j \Delta_{j-1} - t \left(\sum_{j=0}^r \frac{1}{\sigma_j} - \varepsilon \right)$$

and the corresponding equation

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial \sigma_0} = \dots = \frac{\partial f}{\partial \sigma_r} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial t} = 0.$$

One can easily check that the equations above have a unique solution

$$\sigma_j = \frac{S}{\varepsilon \sqrt{\Delta_{j-1}}}$$
 where $S = \sum_{j=0}^r \sqrt{\Delta_{i-1}}$. (A.4)

and it is indeed a minimal point for $f(\sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_r; t)$.

As a result, if we fix ε and want Algorithm 4 to be ε -differentially private, we should choose the noise magnitudes as (A.4). Substituting these noise magnitudes into the accuracy Theorem 4.2, we see that the accuracy gets bounded by $\frac{\sqrt{2}}{\varepsilon n}S^2 + \delta$.

A.9. Proof of Corollary 4.4.

Proof. Let $\Omega = [0, 1]$ with the ℓ^{∞} metric. The natural hierarchical binary decomposition of [0, 1] (cut through the middle) makes subintervals of length diam $(\Omega_{\theta}) = 2^{-j}$ for $\theta \in \{0, 1\}^j$, so $\Delta_j = 1$ for all j, and the resolution is $\delta = 2^{-r}$. Theorem 4.3 makes ε -differential private synthetic data with accuracy

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \le \frac{\sqrt{2}(r+1)^2}{\varepsilon n} + 2^{-r}.$$

A nearly optimal choice for r is $r = \log_2(\varepsilon n) - 1$, which yields

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \le \frac{(2+\sqrt{2})\log_2^2(\varepsilon n)}{\varepsilon n}$$

The optimal noise magnitudes, per (A.4), are $\sigma_j = \log_2^2(\varepsilon n)/\varepsilon$. In other words, the noise *does not* decay with the level.

Let $\Omega = [0,1]^d$ for d > 1. The natural hierarchical binary decomposition of $[0,1]^d$ (cut through the middle along a coordinate hyperplane) makes subintervals of length diam $(\Omega_{\theta}) \simeq 2^{-j/d}$ for $\theta \in \{0,1\}^j$, so $\Delta_j = 2^j \cdot 2^{-j/d} = 2^{(1-1/d)j}$ for all j, and the resolution is $\delta = 2^{-r/d}$. Thus,

$$S = \sum_{j=0}^{r} \sqrt{\Delta_{j-1}} \sim 2^{\frac{1}{2}(1-\frac{1}{d})r}.$$

Theorem 4.3 makes a ε -differential private synthetic data with accuracy

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \lesssim \frac{2^{(1-\frac{1}{d})r}}{\varepsilon n} + 2^{-r/d}.$$

A nearly optimal choice for the depth of the partition is $r = \log_2(\varepsilon n)$, which yields

$$\mathbb{E} W_1(\mu_{\mathcal{X}}, \mu_{\mathcal{Y}}) \lesssim (\varepsilon n)^{-1/d}.$$

The optimal noise magnitudes, per (A.4), are

$$\sigma_j \sim \varepsilon^{-1} 2^{\frac{1}{2}(1-\frac{1}{d})(r-j)}.$$

Thus, the *noise decays* with the level j, becoming O(1) per region for the smallest regions.

A.10. Proof of Lemma 4.6.

Proof. If a, b are comparable, both values are zero. If a, b is not comparable, we can assume $a_1 > b_1$, $a_2 < b_2$ without loss of generality. The set of points that are comparable to b is

$$\{(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_+^2 \mid x_1 \le b_1, x_2 \le b_2\} \cup \{(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_+^2 \mid x_1 \ge b_1, x_2 \ge b_2\}.$$

Note that the distance from a to the first set is $|a_1 - b_1|$ and the distance from a to the second set is $|a_2 - b_2|$. Then flux(a, b) is the smaller one of the two distances, which is also the distance from a to the union set.

A.11. Proof of Lemma 4.7.

Proof. Case 1: $a = (a_1, a_2)$ and $b = (b_1, b_2)$ are comparable. If $a \leq b$, remove $b_1 - a_1$ balls from bin 1 and $b_2 - a_2$ balls from bin 2 to achieve the result. If $b \leq a$, adding $a_1 - b_1$ balls to bin 1 and $a_2 - b_2$ balls to bin 2 to achieve the result.

Case 2: $a = (a_1, a_2)$ and $b = (b_1, b_2)$ are incomparable. Without loss of generality, we can assume that $a_1 - b_1 \ge 0$, $a_2 - b_2 \le 0$.

Assume first that $a_1 - b_1 \ge b_2 - a_2$. Then $\operatorname{flux}(a, b) = b_2 - a_2 := M$. Then $\Delta =: (a_1 + a_2) - (b_1 + b_2) > 0$. Removing Δ balls from bin 1 and transferring M balls from bin 1 to bin 2 achieves the result. Note that there are enough balls in bin 1 to transfer, since $M + \Delta = a_1 - b_1 \in [0, a_1]$.

Now assume that $a_1 - b_1 \le b_2 - a_2$. Then $flux(a, b) = a_1 - b_1 := M$. Then $\Delta =: (b_1 + b_2) - (a_1 + a_2) > 0$. Adding Δ balls to bin 2 and transferring M balls from bin 1 to bin 2 achieves the result.

A.12. Proof of Lemma 4.8.

Proof. First, we make the total number of points in Ω correct by adding m - n points to Ω (or removing, if that number is negative).

Apply Lemma 4.7 for the two parts of Ω : bin Ω_0 that contains n_0 points and bin Ω_1 that contains n_1 points. Since Ω already contains the correct total number of points m, we can make the two bins contain the correct number of points, i.e. m_0 and m_1 respectively, by transferring flux $((n_0, n_1), (m_0, m_1))$ points from one bin to the other.

Apply Lemma 4.7 for the two parts of Ω_0 : bin Ω_{00} that contains n_{00} points and bin Ω_{01} that contains n_{01} points. Since Ω_0 already contains the correct number of points m_0 , we can make the two bins contain the correct number of points, i.e. m_{00} and m_{01} respectively, by transferring flux $((n_{00}, n_{01}), (m_{00}, m_{01}))$ points from one bin to the other.

Similarly, since Ω_1 already has the correct number of points m_1 , we can make Ω_{10} and Ω_{11} contain the correct number of points m_{10} and m_{11} by transferring flux $((n_{00}, n_{01}), (m_{00}, m_{01}))$ points from one bin to the other.

Continuing this way, we can complete the proof. Note that the steps of the iteration procedure we described are interlocked. Each next step determines which subregion the transferred points are selected from, and which subregion they are moved to in the previous step. For example, the original step calls to add (or remove) m - n points to or from Ω , but does not specify how these points are distributed between the two parts Ω_0 and Ω_1 . The application of Lemma 4.7 at the next step determines this.

A.13. Proof of Lemma 4.9.

Proof. We will derive this result from Lemma 4.6. First, let us compute the distance from $a = (n_{\theta 0}, n_{\theta 1})$ to $b' = (n'_{\theta 0}, n'_{\theta 1}) = ((n_{\theta 0} + \lambda_{\theta 0})_+, (n_{\theta 1} + \lambda_{\theta 1})_+)$. Since the map $x \mapsto x_+$ is 1-Lipschitz, we have

$$\left\|a-b'\right\|_{\infty} \leq \max\left(\left|\lambda_{\theta 0}\right|,\left|\lambda_{\theta 1}\right|\right).$$

Furthermore, recall that by Algorithm 3, b' is comparable to $b = (m_{\theta 0}, m_{\theta 1})$. An application of Lemma 4.6 completes the proof.

A.14. Proof of Lemma 4.10.

Proof. Finding the 1-Wasserstein distance in the discrete case is equivalent to solving the optimal transformation problem. In fact, we can obtain μ_U from μ_V by moving $|V \setminus U|$ atoms of μ_V , each having mass 1/|V|, and distributing their mass uniformly over U. The distance for each movement is bounded by diam(Ω). Therefore the 1-Wasserstein distance between μ_U and ν_V is bounded by $\frac{|V \setminus U|}{|V|} \operatorname{diam}(\Omega)$.

APPENDIX B. DISCRETE LAPLACIAN DISTRIBUTION

Recall that the classical Laplacian distribution $Lap_{\mathbb{R}}(\sigma)$ is a continuous distribution with density

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{2\sigma} \exp(-|x|/\sigma), \quad x \in \mathbb{R}.$$

A random variable $X \sim \operatorname{Lap}_{\mathbb{R}}(\sigma)$ has zero mean and

$$\operatorname{Var}(Z) = 2\sigma^2.$$

To deal with counts, it is more convenient to use the *discrete* Laplacian distribution $Lap_{\mathbb{Z}}(\sigma)$, see [30], which has probability mass function

$$f(z) = \frac{1 - p_{\sigma}}{1 + p_{\sigma}} \exp\left(-|z| / \sigma\right), \quad z \in \mathbb{Z}$$

where $p_{\sigma} = \exp(-1/\sigma)$. A random variable $Z \sim \operatorname{Lap}_{\mathbb{Z}}(\sigma)$ has zero mean and

$$\operatorname{Var}(Z) = \frac{2p_{\sigma}}{(1 - p_{\sigma})^2}$$

Thus, one can verify that discrete Laplacian has a smaller variance than its continuous counterpart:

$$\operatorname{Var}(Z) < 2\sigma^2, \tag{B.1}$$

but the gap vanishes for large σ :

$$\operatorname{Var}(Z) \to 2\sigma^2 \quad \text{as } \sigma \to \infty.$$

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