
Example 1.7 (Bus Routes). Here is a loosely defined axiomatic system.
Undefined Terms: Route, Stop
Axioms: (A1) Each route is a list of stops in some order. These are the stops visited by the route.
(A2) Each route visits at least four distinct stops.
(A3) No route visits the same stop twice, except the first stop which is also the last stop.
(A4) There is a stop called downtown that is visited by each route.
(A5) Every stop other than downtown is visited by at most two routes.
Discuss the following questions:
1. Construct a model of the Bus Routes system with exactly three routes. What is the fewest
number of stops you can use?
2. Your answer to 1 shows that this system is: complete, consistent, inconsistent, independent?
3. Does the following describe a model for the Bus Routes system? If not, determine which axioms
are satisfied and which are not?
Stops: Downtown, Walmart, Albertsons, Main St., CVS, Trader Joes, Zoo
Route 1: Downtown, Walmart, Main St., CVS, Zoo, Downtown
Route 2: Main St., CVS, Zoo, Albertsons, Downtown, Main St.
Route 3: Walmart, Main St., Downtown, Albertsons, Main St., Walmart
4. Show that A3 is independent of the other axioms.
5. Demonstrate that ‘There are exactly three routes’ is not a theorem in this system by finding a
model in which it is false.
We are only scratching the surface of axiomatics. If you really want to dive down this rabbit hole,
consider taking a class in formal logic or model theory. As an example of the ideas involved, we
finish with two results proved in 1931 by the German logician Kurt G
¨
odel.
Theorem 1.8 (G¨odel’s incompleteness theorems).
1. Any consistent system containing the natural numbers is incomplete.
2. The consistency of such a system cannot be proved within the system itself.
G
¨
odel’s first theorem tells us that there is no ultimate consistent complete axiomatic system. Perhaps
this is reassuring: there will always be undecidable statements, so mathematics will never be fin-
ished! However, the undecidable statements cooked up by G
¨
odel are analogues of the famous liar
paradox (‘This sentence is false’), so the profundity of this is a matter of debate.
G
¨
odel’s second theorem fleshes out the difficulty in proving the consistency of an axiomatic system.
If a system is sufficiently detailed so as to describe the natural numbers, its consistency can at best be
proved relative to some other axiomatic system. In practice, demonstrating that a useful axiomatic
system really is consistent is essentially impossible!
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